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COMMENTS
that case, a wife was forced to pay an inheritance tax on her
half of the community, upon the death of her husband, under a
California statute covering all property passing from any person
who "may die seized or possessed of same." The Supreme Court
held that a state did have the power to include the entire com-
munity in such a case without thereby violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. There was some doubt, at the time this case was
decided, as to whether or not the wife in California actually had
a present vested interest in the community. The court, however,
made it clear that its disposition of the case would have been the
same under either situation.
Under the estate taxation principles laid down by the Wiener
case, Louisiana and the other community property states will
henceforth share the burden equally with the other states of the
union. It will be noted, however, the principal case does not es-
tablish a precedent for income taxation, 29 as the previous income
tax cases were not overruled. The court did not find it necessary
to distinguish them. Legislation would be required, as matters
stand, to effect a change in that field of taxation. In view of the
fact that changes will very likely be presented for congressional
approbation in the near future, the community property states
may well weigh the merits of joining in an attempt to work out
a fair statutory adjustment of the problem, rather than standing
adamant in opposition to any change which would destroy the
present income tax advantages of their people.
MARTHA E. KIRK
PRESENT INSANITY- ITS SCOPE AND DETERMINATION
Under Article 261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there
are four special pleas open to an accused in a criminal trial in
Louisiana. Included in these is the plea of insanity, which has
two separate and distinct aspects: insanity at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime and insanity at the time of the
trial. The two have often been confused and, as a result, Louisi-
ana jurisprudence on the subject presents a varied and conflict-
29. It is interesting to note that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has
accorded income tax recognition to the Oklahoma mandatory community
property law, which became effective July 27, 1945. The bureau specifically
holds that income earned and received after that date is community income,
and one-half may be reported by each spouse. Prentice-Hall, 1946 Fed. Tax.
Serv. J 76,087 (Jan. 18, 1946).
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ing pattern. The picture has been somewhat clarified by Act 136
of 1932 and Act 261 of 1944 which amended Article 267 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Present insanity of an accused challenges the right of the
state to proceed with the prosecution of the person thus afflicted,
but it does not detract from the responsibility for the crime. In
this regard, the plea is different from that of insanity at the time
of the commission of the crime. The latter is a defense that re-
lates to the guilt or innocence of the accused and must be passed
on by a jury." This discussion will be limited to the plea of
present insanity, although an occasional reference to the plea of
insanity at the time of the crime must be made for purposes of
comparison.
The time and manner of raising the plea of insanity has been
a much litigated question. In the early case of State v Reed 2 the
supreme court, in reversing the decision of the trial judge, held
that the absence of a special plea was not sufficient reason for
refusing admission of testimony offered to prove the defendant's
insanity at the time of the trial. Such evidence is admissible at
any stage of the proceedings, even though there has been no spe-
cial or formal plea. Not only is oral presentation of the plea of
insanity adequate in the absence of a special plea, but the court
may act upon its own observations of the defendant's condition.
Regardless of the manner or time of presentation, the evidence
must be considered and disposed of by the court. The method of
disposal may be a submission of the question of present insanity
to the jury along with the question of guilt or innocence, as sug-
gested above.
In the later case of State v. Charles,; the trial judge had ap-
pointed a commission of five physicians to examine, determine,
and report their findings on the present mental condition of the
accused. The commission found that the defendant was sane,
thus disposing of the plea of present insanity, and the case pro-
ceeded to trial. The supreme court held that such procedure was
permissible4 and that the trial judge might either follow this
1. La. Act 17 of 1928 (E.S.), later Arts. 268-273, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of
1928, provided for the trial of this plea by a commission. This procedure
was declared unconstitutional in State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639
(1929). Accord: State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
2. 41 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 132 (1889).
3. 124 La. 744, 50 So. 699 (1909).
4. 124 La. 744, 746, 50 So. 699, 700, citing In re Chandler, 45 La. Ann. 696,12
So. 884 (1893) and State ex rel. Armstrong v. Judge of Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict, 48 La. Ann. 503, 19 So. 475 (1896).
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method or allow the trial to proceed and submit the question of
present insanity to the jury.5
This informal method of procedure was repudiated in 1915 in
State v. McIvtosh.0 In that case the supreme court rejected both
the alternative methods of disposing of the plea of present in-
sanity that had been held permissible in the Reed and Charles
decisions. Justice O'Niell distinguished the plea of insanity at
the time of the crime, which is a jury question, to be considered
along with other evidence of guilt or innocence, and the plea of
present insanity; which merely challenges the right of the state
to proceed with the prosecution. The court concluded that if the
plea of present insanity is filed before the trial by jury has com-
menced, it must be heard and decided by the judge alone before
allowing the prosecution to proceed.7  Compare, however, the
case of State v. Cropper," where, after all the evidence had been
received and argument had begun, counsel for the accused urged
present insanity and moved the court, on the evidence before it,
to take the case from the jury and pass judgment declaring the
accused insane and committing him to an insane asylum. The
trial judge refused to take the case from the jury but submitted
to them the question of present insanity along with the main
issue of guilt or innocence. On appeal the supreme court held
that at that stage of the trial it was not incumbent on the trial
judge to stay the proceedings in order to enter upon an inquiry
as to the present mental condition of the accused; but rather he
might properly allow the trial to proceed, reserving his inquiry
and judgment until after the verdict was returned on the main
issue. On the other hand, however, the court clearly pointed out
5. State v. Charles, 124 La. 744, 746, 50 So. 699, 700 (1909), citing State v.
Reed, 41 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 132 (1889).
6. 136 La. 1000, 68 So. 104 (1915).
7. Apparently not all district judges were immediately conversant with
the rule established by the McIntosh case. In 1917 in the case of State v.
Lafosse, 142 La. 278, 76 So. 713 (1917) the defendant was tried on a plea of not
guilty and acquitted on grounds of insanity and the judge ordered him com-
mitted to an insane asylum. While awaiting such confinement, the defend-
ant contended that he had recovered his sanity and was therefore not sub-
ject to interdiction or confinement. The trial judge refused to hear evidence
that the defendant was not sane and not dangerous to the community but
held that the verdict of "not guilty because of insanity" put an end to the
court's jurisdiction on the question of insanity subsequent to the commis-
sion of the crime and that therefore the question of present sanity or in-
sanity should be determined by the authorities in charge of the state insane
asylum. The supreme court in reversing held that the verdict does not dis-
pose of present insanity and that under the statute (La. Rev. Stats. of 1870,
§ 993 [Art. 603, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928]) the judge had authority to
commit such a defendant to an asylum if he deemed it dangerous to the
community for him to be at large but that the party so acquitted has the
right to a hearing before the judge to determine whether sanity is recovered.
8. 153 La. 545, 96 So. 116 (1923).
1946]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that the question of present insanity of the accused must be
passed on by the judge alone and not by the jury called to pass
on guilt or innocence of the accused. After a verdict has been
rendered, only the judge may pass on the question of present
insanity. To this extent the Cropper case expressly reaffirmed
the McIntosh decision and firmly established the rule that the
judge alone decides the issue of present insanity.
Since the Cropper case the court has more fully developed
the various ramifications of the rule. One example is the case of
State v. Brodes,9 where the court stated that while insanity at the
time of the crime was tried by the jury with other questions of
fact and was not reviewable on appeal, the plea of present in-
sanity, being ruled on by the judge alone without jury interven-
tion, was reviewable on appeal on both law and fact.
It is now well settled that the trial judge decides the ques-
tion of present insanity,10 but the correlative problems of how the
judge determines the issue and the extent of his discretion on
the matter have not been clarified. In 1927, before adoption of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the case of State v. Genna"l
objection was made to the admission of the testimony of three
experts concerning the present sanity of the accused on the
grounds that the examination had been made upon a court order
which had not been requested by the defendant, and that such
procedure was tantamount to forcing the accused to give testi-
mony against himself. The court held that it is the duty of the
judge, relying upon the "humanity of the court," on suggestion
of anyone, or even ex mero motu, if he has any doubt, to inform
himself as to whether the accused is in mental condition to un-
derstand his position and present his defense. It found that the
methods of procedure to these ends are entirely discretionary.
The limitations on the judge's discretion in this matter can best
be illustrated by a brief review of several subsequent cases. In
State v. Patterson,12 at a contradictory hearing, three experts on
a court appointed commission declared the defendant insane.
Only one lay witness stated that the accused was capable of an-
swering questions put to him. At the end of the hearing the trial
judge found the accused sane and tried him, stating that the pre-
9. 156 La. 428, 100 So. 610 (1924).
10. The most recent case in point, State v. Gunter, 23 So. (2d) 305 (La.
.1945), decided under Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended
by La. Act 136 of 1932 and La. Act 261 of 1944, cited the McIntosh and
Cropper cases as authority for the proposition that the judge alone deter-
mines the issue of the accused's present mental condition.
11. 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927).
12. 176 La. 440, 146 So. 17 (1933).
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sumption is that a man is sane until the contrary is proved by a
fair preponderance of the evidence. The supreme court held that
even though this may be true, the presumption is inapplicable
when the lunacy commission finds and reports the defendant in-
sane. It pointed out that the commission's report can be over-
come only by proof and that in the present case the evidence was
insufficient to do so. The court qualified this proposition by stat-
ing that while the opinions of experts are not conclusive, they
are of great value; and the court cannot arbitrarily substitute its
own contrary opinion therefor. Certainly there is no class of
cases in which the use of expert testimony is so general and al-
most indispensable as that in which the issue is sanity or insanity.
Another illustration of the scope of the judge's discretionary
power is shown by the case of S tate v. Ridguwy, 13 wherein the
judge refused to appoint experts to examine defendant. In this
case the defendant's plea of insanity was accompanied by affi-
davits of his mother and aunt and were filed on the day of the
trial. The supreme court held that the appointment of experts
is a matter which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge and that the mere assertion by the defendant of his insan-
ity accompanied by affidavits does not necessarily establish a
real question as to sanity. A reasonable ground to believe the
defendant insane can arise in the mind of the trial judge only
when information to that effect is furnished by a trustworthy
source, such as the statements of creditable parties or the court's
own observation.14
If the court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant
insane, he must order a hearing. 5 Such a hearing should be
full and complete. The accused should be allowed to rebut the
findings of the commission and to offer witnesses on his own be-
half, if necessary. 16 However, if at the contradictory hearing, no
evidence is offered by the defendant and no objection is made to
the ruling of the trial judge on the issue of sanity, a failure to re-
serve a bill of exceptions to such ruling operates as a waiver or
acquiescence under Article 510 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. The court in State v. JamesIT ruled to this effect with the
13. 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1933).
14. As stated in State v. Washington, 207 La. 849, 22 So. (2d) 193, 195
(1945), the doctrine of the Ridgway case has been followed and approved in
the following cases: State v. McManus, 187 La. 9, 174 So. 91 (1937); State v.
Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940) (discussed infra note 18); State v.
Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So. (2d) 870 (1943). See also State v. Gunter, 23 So.
(2d) 305 (La. 1945).
15. 185 La. 308, 169 So. 417 (1936).
16. State v. Hebert, 186 La. 308, 172 So. 167 (1937).
17. 196 La. 459, 199 So. 391 (1940).
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qualifying provision that under the circumstances prevailing in
that case the trial judge correctly found the defendant sane and
that there was no abuse of discretion, since all the testimony
showed sanity.' 8
CHAREST D. THIBAUT.
NAVIGABILITY AS APPLIED TO LAKES IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana's peculiar topographical structure including an
abundance of bayous, creeks, swamps, and lowlands frequently
covered by water has been, with the discovery of rich oil deposits
under these waters, a source of frequent litigation in the past few
decades. The jurisprudence on the legal questions involved has
been most controversial. However, through diligent efforts on
the part of the courts, legal doctrines derived in the more recent
cases1 would appear to solve many of the more crucial problems.
Since the drafters of our code omitted an express provision
regarding lakes,2 perhaps the most troublesome issue presented
has been whether or not Articles 509 and 510 of the Civil Code
apply to these bodies of water. An examination of the cases does
not reveal to the student of the subject a clear definition of the
word "lake." Any adequate treatment of the problems raised
by these uncertainties must necessarily be concerned with the
divergent rules applicable to navigable and non-navigable lakes.
Navigable Lakes
Litigation on the question may arise by a claim on the part
of a riparian owner to alluvion additions to the bed of a water-
way when the waterline has receded. It may also arise through
a claim by the state to an area which has been submerged by the
waters of the lake.$
18. In State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940). the supreme court
held that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to allow the
defendant to withdraw a not guilty plea and plead present insanity on the
day of the second trial following a mistrial in the original trial when the
judge was convinced by examination and observation of the defendant that
he was presently sane and felt that the plea of present insanity was filed
solely for purposes of delay.
1. State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. (2d) 136 (1944); Transcontinental
Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 24 So. (2d) 248 (La. 1946).
2. Art. 558, French Civil Code, was omitted from the Louisiana Codes.
The French article stated: "Alluvion does not take place in connection with
lakes and ponds, of which the owner always retains the land covered by
the water when it reaches the level of the outlet of the pond, even if the
volume of water should decrease."
3. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); State v. Bozeman, 156
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